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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the role of arms export production in achieving financial 
cost savings to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). A review of three 
theoretical benefits, identified by arms trade scholars, that DoD enjoys as a result 
of arms export production shows that there is some merit to the claim that unit 
costs may be lowered as a result of exports.  Using the F-16 fighter aircraft as a 
case study, this research employs financial cost analysis using cost improvement 
curves to estimate the extent to which DoD benefitted in terms of reduced per-
unit costs through concurrent export production.  This research makes a 
significant contribution to the cost analysis and arms exports literature by 
quantifying commonly purported financial benefits attributable to arms export 
production. 
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Historically, arms exports have been a critical lever of U.S. foreign policy 
and remain so today (Bajusz and Louscher, 1988; Agmon et al., 1996; DISAM, 
2010).  The proposed $60 billion sale to Saudi Arabia in 2010—which included 
84 F-15 fighters, 60 Apache attack helicopters, and 72 Black Hawk utility 
helicopters—is a relevant and contemporary example.  The publicly stated 
objective of the sale was to counter the rise of Iran as a regional power (Lee, 
2010).  While there is great potential that this sale can indeed disrupt the balance 
of military power in the Near East region, it also initiates a very robust flow of 
revenues to the U.S. defense industrial base and highlights the fact that arms 
exports may also be useful economic and financial levers for the domestic 
industrial base.  Arms trade scholars—Bajusz and Louscher, (1988), Sandler & 
Hartley (1995), Agmon et al., (1996)—argue that arms exports have numerous 
financial benefits including reducing per unit procurement costs and preserving 
production lines.  However, there is a dearth of research that actually shows that 
per unit costs to the U.S. Department of Defense have actually been lowered as 
a result of increased sales to foreign buyers. 
President Bill Clinton stated that financial factors are relevant 
considerations for arms sales, in his 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 34 
(PDD-34) that became the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy.  The 
President outlined key decision criteria for each proposed arms transfer, with one 
being the assessment of the impact of the proposed sale on the U.S. defense 
industrial base.  Typically, financial factors are not a cause of discord unless 
there is a potential financial gain that is associated with a potentially negative 
foreign policy or security impact (Agmon et al., 1996).   
Agmon et al. (1996) assert that the CAT policy gives rise to a two-step 
decision-making process for proposed arms transfers.  First, if the net foreign 
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policy and national security impact is positive, the sale is approved.  If the net 
impact is negative, financial factors may be considered and weighed against the 
negative impact to national security or foreign policy.  It is unlikely the U.S. 
government will export arms to a nation when the export will have an overtly 
negative impact on U.S. national security or foreign policy, no matter the 
magnitude of the financial benefits.  Agmon et al. (1996) interpret the CAT policy 
to specify that when negative national security and foreign policy impacts are 
marginal and uncertain, the proposition of large financial benefits weighs in favor 
of approving the arms transfer.  However, Agmon et al. (1996) offer a compelling 
counterargument to this conventional thinking: any arms transfer negatively 
impacting U.S. foreign policy and national security should be avoided, even if the 
defense industrial base stands to benefit.  The rationale is that these negative 
effects can entail infringement of political freedoms or lead to armed conflicts.  In 
sum, the consideration of financial factors arising from proposed arms transfers 
is an important aspect that this research attempts to quantify, in part, through 
analyzing the financial benefits in arms export production. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
This research examines the extent to which the U.S. benefits from 
producing arms for export.  Specifically, this research explores the role of arms 
export production in reducing U.S. per unit costs when U.S. and export 
production is concurrent. 
Chapter II surveys the U.S. and global defense economic environments.  
A significant reduction in defense spending occurred after the end of the Cold 
War that shaped the contemporary defense environment.  The reduction in 
resources spurred a consolidation of the U.S. defense industrial base that 
significantly reduced the number of defense contractors thereby altering the 
dynamics of defense economics.  As the cost of new weapon systems escalates, 
arms exports may become increasingly attractive as options for reducing the per 
unit costs to the U.S. Department of Defense. 
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Chapter III identifies three sources of potential savings associated with 
export production: reducing fixed and nonrecurring per unit costs, reducing costs 
through achieving economies of scale and learning, and preserving production 
lines. 
Chapter IV introduces the F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft program as a 
case study to quantify the financial gains realized through learning and 
economies of scale attributed to export production.  Using a rate adjustment cost 
improvement analysis, the case study shows the per unit costs DoD would have 
incurred without the concurrent export production of F-16s.  Chapter IV also 
discusses the potential benefits to the U.S. associated with keeping the F-16 
production line “warm” through export production. 
Finally, Chapter V provides concluding remarks on the significance of the 
cost improvement analysis and discusses the limits on applying these findings in 
a broader context to other weapon systems. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTEMPORARY U.S. DEFENSE 
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL 
BASE 
In order to appreciate the importance of financial factors in arms exports 
decisions, it is necessary to consider the post-Cold War defense economic 
environment.  In 1991, the U.S. emerged from the Cold War with the former 
Soviet Union, ending a standoff that lasted more than 40 years at a cost in 
excess of $18.2 trillion in constant 2010 dollars, measured by total defense 
spending from 1948–1991 (Calhoun, 1996).  Previous wars in U.S. history, 
particularly the Civil War and World War I, resulted in short, sharp defense 
spending spikes followed by long periods of significantly reduced defense 
expenditures.  Usually a significant post-war drawdown occurred, followed by a 
period of little or no conflict.  World War II would have followed this pattern had 
the onset of the Korean War not occurred (Sapolsky and Gholz, 1999).  
However, the Cold War resulted in decades of military build-up that resulted in an 
abrupt and significant drawdown during the early post-Cold War years. 
1. Rise of the “Private” Arsenals 
The early years of the Cold War saw robust defense spending and a 
burgeoning defense industry that was punctuated, somewhat unsurprisingly, 
during the Korean War, Vietnam War and the buildup during the 1980s under the 
Reagan administration.  The sustained effort to build and modernize America’s 
military consequently raised an army of private defense contractors whose 
growth and largesse was heretofore an unknown creature to the American 
economy.  President Eisenhower recognized this danger early on and warned 
the public of the rise of the military industrial complex in his farewell address to 
the nation in 1961 (Eisenhower, 1961). 
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In the public-sector defense industry, government retained its technical 
knowledge and industrial capacity by keeping its civil servants employed in its 
arsenals and shipyards, even if demand dropped and production rates fell to zero 
(Sapolsky and Gholz, 1999).  This sheltering effect of government employment 
helped keep the industrial base warm.  However, in private industry, once a 
production run concluded, the firm had no incentive to keep the production line 
open.  The shift from a public defense industrial base to a private-dominated 
defense industrial base meant that production lines closed when military demand 
diminished or the contract ended. 
2. Era of Consolidation 
The conclusion of the Cold War redefined industrial requirements.  
Coupled with already reduced defense spending levels, post-Cold War 
requirements no longer supported robust production capacity.  The end of the 
Cold War reduced the requirement to hold a large inventory of weapons.  The 
period between 1985 and 1995 saw the longest continuous post-World War II 
procurement budget decline (GAO, 1997).  For private firms, this reduction in 
defense spending resulted in production lines closing due to lack of demand and 
funding.  The defense budgets could no longer support the industry’s capacity, 
resulting in firms having significant and costly excess capacity.  In addition to 
diminished defense spending levels, the compounding effect of reduced demand 
and bountiful Cold War residual inventory crowded out new procurement and 
compelled many private industry firms to revisit their business strategy for future 
profitability.  Many firms merged with others or exited the industry altogether.  
Defense industry mergers in the early 1990s were intended to reduce the 
defense industry’s excess capacity. 
Lower defense procurement budgets disproportionately affected small 
defense firms.  Many of these firms relied on subcontracts from larger original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  A study by Velocci (1994) showed that large 
contractors cut 50 to 80 percent of their subcontractors from their major weapons 
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programs.  Consequently, once the subcontracts dried up, many of the smaller 
firms exited the defense industry or shifted to commercial applications. 
Although the overall market for U.S. arms has expanded since World War 
II, the private defense industry has experienced significant consolidation.  The 
aircraft sector alone shrunk from twenty-six to seven contractors between 1945 
and 1996 (see Figure 1), the number of firms competing in the armored tank 
industry dropped from sixteen to two, and the number of firms competing in the 
missile industry dropped from twenty-two to nine (GAO, 1997).   
 
 
Figure 1.   Consolidation of U.S. Military Aircraft Manufacturers, 1945–96 (From 
Pages, 1999) 
Firms that were once defense industry giants, such as Rockwell, Curtiss-
Wright and Westinghouse, became footnotes in the history of the wars they 
fortified or returned to non-defense activities (Pages, 1999).  Figure 2 illustrates 
how the consolidation of defense firms stove-piped from many firms into the 
current “big four”: Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon and Northrop-Grumman. 
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Figure 2.   U.S. Defense Mergers in the 1990s (From Markusen and Costigan, 
1999) 
B. THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE 
1. The Rising Costs of Weapon System Technologies 
The underlying economics of weapon system technologies do not favor 
DoD efforts to reduce costs.  Recent U.S. weapon system programs, such as the 
F-22 and F-35, show that per-unit research and development (R&D) costs far 
exceed those of their comparable predecessors and other weapon systems 
experienced similar cost increases.  Hartley (2007) argues these cost increases 
reflect the “technical arms race” where next generation weapons are more 
effective than their predecessors, but have significantly higher R&D and 
production costs.  In fact, Kirkpatrick observed a 10 percent annual increase in 
real unit production costs for combat aircraft (as cited in Hartley, 2007).  Given 
the empirical data, it is reasonable to conclude that a sustained upward trend in 
per unit weapon system costs will be observed well into the future. 
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2. U.S. Defense Market 
The domestic U.S. defense environment is characterized by a semi-
competitive imperfect market (Anderton, 1995).  The market itself is a 
monopsony, with multiple supplying defense firms and only one major buyer—the 
Department of Defense.  As the one and only domestic buyer, DoD controls 
demand and also serves as the market regulator.  These market dynamics afford 
DoD much control over the size, structure, conduct, performance and ownership 
of arms industries (Hartley, 2007).  Table 1 shows how the various aspects of the 
defense industrial base are controlled, or heavily influenced by, DoD. 
Table 1.   U.S. Government Control of the Defense Industry (From Hartley, 2007) 
 Aspect of the Defense Industrial Base
Controlled by the U.S. Government 
Example of Control 
Size Changes in defense spending (i.e. war, 
drawdown) affect the size of a nation’s 
defense industrial base 
Structure Allows or prevents mergers
Prevents entry or exit (i.e. bailouts) 
Conduct Specify form and terms of competitions 
Performance Regulates profits on non-competitive 
contracts and controls exports (both quality 
and quantity) 
Ownership of Arms Industries Determines whether firms and the industry 
will be state- or privately-owned 
 
 
DoD demands goods and services from two types of markets: one that is 
reasonably competitive and one that is imperfect.  The procurement of 
computers, information technology (IT) infrastructure, office equipment, and 
garrison transportation equipment are all “commercial-off-the-shelf” (or COTS) 
items or technologies.  Since COTS items have many buyers outside of DoD, 
these items have a competitive market price driven by supply and demand.  At 
the other extreme, DoD develops requirements for next-generation weapon 
system technologies for which there is no discernable “market price” (Flamm, 
1999).  In essence, contracted price and subsequent stated value are determined 
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by the asymmetrical bargaining power of the defense firm or DoD, not market 
forces.  While DoD would seem to have considerable bargaining power as 
monopsonist, it is actually disadvantaged in contract negotiations for unique and 
technologically advanced major weapon systems due to a lack of proprietary 
information regarding the exogenous technology and production variables 
(Hartley, 2007). 
3. Global Arms Market 
The contemporary U.S. defense industry itself is a private complex, 
consisting of profit-maximizing firms.  Basic economic theory stipulates that it 
would have no interest in arms exports if it were not a profitable venture.  While 
the defense industry does have DoD’s interests in mind, given their dynamic 
symbiotic relationship, they also have another interest in mind—that of their 
shareholders.  Shareholders measure the defense firms’ performance on their 
increases in quarterly and annual revenues and earnings. Exports open up new 
markets and sources of revenues—and hopefully profits.  The defense firms are 
therefore incentivized to incorporate export production into their business 
models.  
Unlike the domestic market, the global arms market is much more 
competitive.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent privatization 
of the former Soviet industrial base significantly increased competition among the 
defense industrial bases of Russia, the U.S., Britain, and Western Europe.  
Additionally, the end of the Cold War virtually eliminated the regional arms races 
amongst the superpowers, characterized by substantial arms transfers to nations 
allied to the U.S. or the U.S.S.R in the form of foreign aid.  With a global defense 
industry relying directly on customer-nations for sales, the customer-nations now 
have increased buyer power (Johnson, 1995).  As a result, customer-nations are 
increasingly shrewd and demanding, trying to maximize the benefits of their own 
defense spending (Anderton, 1995).  As astute consumers in a global arms trade 
of imperfect markets, complex transactions and asymmetrical information, 
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customer-nations seek ways to enhance welfare and reduce the total cost of 
major military imports by recapturing some of their investment in foreign weapon 
systems (Sandler and Hartley, 1995).  One such popular method is the use of 
offsets, which are one of the most significant macroeconomic issues in the 
discussion of arms exports (Gold, 1999).  By definition, they are contractual 
arrangements between an exporter and importer that provide the customer-
nation with a means of compensation through realizing other economic benefits.  
Between 1993 and 2008, “U.S. firms reported entering into 677 offset 
agreements with 45 countries valued at $68.93 billion” representing “70.96 
percent of the $97.13 billion in foreign sales of defense items reported during the 
period” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009).  Much discussion surrounds the 
use of offsets that will not be treated in this research.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that offsets are an important fixture of the global arms 
trade and global defense environment that affects both the U.S. and the 
customer-nations. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Post-Cold War defense environment is characterized by the 
emergence of a global arms market characterized by private, profit-maximizing 
firms seeking greater market share and customer nations – many that previously 
had neither the wealth to afford nor access to buy advanced weapons – seeking 
more advanced, lethal products that are affordable to deploy and maintain. The 
defense industrial base that emerged in the United States after the Cold War was 
one consolidated into a small handful of large firms.  The oligopoly of defense 
firms on the supply side, as well as the monopsonistic DoD buyer on the demand 
side, characterize domestic defense economic exchange as a semi-competitive 
imperfect market.  The inefficiencies existing in the domestic market, in 
conjunction with reduced Post-Cold War spending levels and escalating weapon 
system technology costs, make arms export production an attractive lever for 
realizing cost savings within DoD.  From a financial standpoint, arms export 
production appears to be a nexus for both DoD interests in reducing their  
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cost burden in acquiring major weapon systems and defense industrial base 
interests of maintaining profitability and a competitive advantage in the global 
arms market. 
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III. REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF 
ARMS EXPORT PRODUCTION 
Affordability is a top priority in the acquisition of any weapon system.  An 
easy cost-savings target for the Department of Defense is to seek savings in 
end-items not yet procured.  A popular, contemporary conjecture is that U.S. 
arms exports financially benefit the Department of Defense, the U.S. defense 
industrial base, and the nation as a whole.  Arms exports can potentially provide 
substantial gains to the exporting nation and arms trade scholars Bajusz and 
Louscher (1988), Sandler & Hartley (1995), and Agmon et al. (1996) 
acknowledge that arms exports theoretically provide financial benefits to the 
Department of Defense through: 
1. Reducing nonrecurring and fixed per unit costs; 
2. Reducing per unit costs through achieving economies of scale and 
learning, and;  
3. Preserving production lines. 
A. REDUCING NONRECURRING COSTS AND FIXED COSTS 
Theoretically, a larger production volume enables total fixed costs to be 
spread over a larger allocation base.  The fixed cost per unit component of total 
unit cost should then decrease as production increases within the relevant range.  
However, the U.S. experiences a reduction in such costs to include R&D and 
production if, and only if, a portion of these nonrecurring costs are allocated to 
the customer-nation.  If DoD incurs the fixed R&D cost, applies it only to 
domestic orders and waives the R&D cost for export orders, DoD bears the 
financial burden.  The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Section 21(e)(2)(A) [22 
USC Sec. 2761] stipulates that DoD must charge the customer-nation its 
proportional share of the nonrecurring costs in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
deal.  However, nonrecurring costs for particular sales to NATO and other eligible 
countries may be waived if the deal significantly advances U.S. interests (DISAM, 
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2010).  Note that the nonrecurring cost waiver only applies to FMS cases 
administrated by DoD.  Direct sales by the contractor are not required to charge 
the customer-nation its proportional share of recurring cost.  The DoD waiving or 
failing to recoup these costs enables the defense contractor to remain 
competitive on price. 
By waiving nonrecurring costs and not charging customer-nations their 
proportional share of such costs, direct sales greatly benefit the profit-maximizing 
defense contractor.  The defense contractor can then export the military goods at 
a price determined by the average variable costs to produce the weapon system 
and thereby increase its competitiveness in the global arms market.  In other 
words, placing the nonrecurring cost burden on DoD amounts to the U.S. 
taxpayers subsidizing foreign arms sales. 
In 1998, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that DoD 
had not recovered $183 million in nonrecurring costs from delivered sales—some 
of which dated back to 1989 (GAO, 1998).  Though the GAO admonished DoD 
for poor financial management practices, this example highlights the fact that 
bureaucratic inconsistencies and a lack of coordination can result in not only the 
failure of the U.S. public to realize cost savings through arms exports but also in 
the public subsidization of foreign arms transfers. 
B. REDUCING PER UNIT COSTS THROUGH ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
AND LEARNING 
A second source of cost savings is in the scale of production.  Large 
production runs can lower costs through economies of scale and learning.  
Economies of scale refer to the relationship between a firm’s cost and output.  A 
firm enjoys economies of scale when it can double its output for less than twice 
the cost, where marginal cost is less than average cost.  Conversely, 
diseconomies of scale occur when doubling output results in more than twice the 
cost, where marginal cost is greater than average cost (Pindyck, 1998).  Given a 
production setting for which the long run average cost curve is u-shaped, 
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economies of scale tend to occur when increasing production from lower 
production levels, while a firm potentially experiences diseconomies when 
increasing production from higher production levels.  Theoretically, DoD benefits 
from economies of scale if it can augment the lower levels of weapon system 
production for domestic consumption with foreign orders.   
Assuming that augmenting domestic production with foreign orders occurs 
while the defense contractor experiences increasing returns to scale, increasing 
production will result in a lower per-unit cost than without foreign orders.  Further, 
not all cost reductions are the same.  As illustrated in Figure 3, movement along 
the long run average cost curve in the downward, negative-sloped region, 
reveals that marginal cost reductions decrease at a slower rate until reaching 
constant returns to scale where increases in total cost are proportional to output.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Long Run Average Cost Curve (From Waterson, 2010) 
This equates to additive foreign orders theoretically having a greater 
impact in reducing per-unit cost early when the level of production is low.  
However, augmenting domestic production with foreign orders will not always 
provide a lower per-unit cost.  Recall the discussion of diseconomies of scale. If 
the additive foreign orders occur during decreasing returns to scale, the addition 
of foreign orders would actually provide a higher per unit cost.   
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Similar to economies of scale, learning curve theory also can reduce per 
unit costs.  Learning curve theory helps estimate the incremental per-unit cost 
reduction in the production process.  Introduced by T.P. Wright in 1936 as a 
result of his observations in aircraft production, learning curve theory helps 
estimate unit costs based on cumulative production.  It follows that if learning 
occurs in the production process, each time the volume of production doubles, 
the per unit cost decreases at a predictable rate (FAA, 2010).  Put differently, the 
cost of the doubled unit equals the cost of the un-doubled unit multiplied by the 
slope of the learning curve (Nussbaum, 2010).  Therefore, the equation defining 
the learning curve is exponential and negatively sloped.  Figure 4 illustrates 
Wright’s learning curve, where Y equals cumulative average unit cost, a equals 
theoretical first unit cost, X equals cumulative production quantity and b equals 
the slope of the function.  The shape of the learning curve makes it evident that 
more learning and consequently greater per-unit cost reductions occur early in 
the production process. 
 
Figure 4.   Wright’s Learning Curve Model (From Martin, 2010) 
Both economies of scale and learning curve theory posit per-unit cost 
reductions.  However, the basis for economies of scale is the scale of production, 
while learning curve cost reductions rely on cumulative production.  Therefore, 
arms exports theoretically provide the largest cost reductions if they are 
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incorporated at the beginning of production.  Conversely, dedicating units of 
production for export towards the end of a U.S. procurement will have a 
significantly lesser effect on cost reduction.  Making the case for arms exports, 
unit cost savings depends greatly on both the scale of production and learning 
already achieved.  In practice however, it is difficult to distinguish between 
economies of scale and learning. 
Empirical research shows that it has become increasingly difficult to 
isolate cost savings between economies of scale and learning (Hartley, 2007).  
However, Hartley (2007) suggests that the median per unit cost savings by 
increasing the scale of production from minimum efficiency to ideal conditions 
was 10–20 percent for all weapon systems studied (Hartley, 2006).  Table 2 
shows the cost savings associated with different weapon systems as the scale of 
production moves towards most efficient conditions. 
Table 2.   Estimated Savings through Minimum to Optimal Production for Selected 
Weapon Systems (From Hartley, 2006) 
Weapon System Type Costs Savings (Percentage) 
Warships <10 
Tanks <10 
Combat Aircraft 20 
Conventional Munitions 20-30 
Missiles 25-40 
 
Further, Sandler and Hartley (1995) suggest that the production and 
learning curves associated with aircraft production range from 75 to 80 percent.  
The production and learning curves associated with other weapon system 
production, to include aircraft engines, avionics, electronics, missiles, main battle 
tanks and warships range from 70 to 96 percent (Ibid.).  While labor learning is 
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paramount, Hartley (2007) points out that cost reductions associated with 
learning have been affected by modern manufacturing methods, new materials 
and business practices, such as computer-aided design/computer-aided 
manufacturing, lean and six sigma methods, and supply chain changes. 
C. PRESERVING PRODUCTION LINES  
The U.S. and DoD benefit from production lines with capacity dedicated 
for export production.  Generally, the decision to keep a production line open is a 
balance between cost and schedule (or response time).  An open production line 
serves as an insurance policy of sorts.  First, it provides the U.S. with surge 
capacity in wartime or in the case of emergent, sudden conflicts; an open 
production line allows for a quick and cost-effective response.  Second, an open 
production line prevents the cessation of requisite production capabilities and 
atrophy of employee skill-sets that are needed for production in the near-term.  
Reconstituting a stagnant production line can incur high restart costs in addition 
to significant increases in lead times (Gold, 1999). 
Gaps in production lines occur due to misalignment of U.S. weapon 
system procurement or conversion.  There are three options to address gaps in 
production.  First, a production line could go “cold,” whereby it will be 
reconstituted later.  Birkler, Large, Smith and Timson (1993) suggest that 
reconstituting a cold production line can sometimes be the most cost-effective 
solution, since restarted programs take less time from program start to first 
delivery and are less expensive and risky than the original program.  However, 
when reconstituting a cold production line is deemed more costly, other options 
exist.  An alternative to letting a production grow “cold” is to keep it “warm” 
through sustained low-rate production.  This is often the desired option when the 
system is a critical national asset with one supplier and no commercial market 
because if production ceases, the supplier might go out of business (Birkler et al., 
1993).  While keeping the production line “warm” might be a lower cost 
alternative the costs may still be extraordinarily high due to the fact that the 
 19
existing fixed cost structures were designed for high rate production.  The third 
option is maintaining high rate production and storing any excess or unneeded 
equipment for later use or contingencies.  In this case, it could also mean selling 
the excess to foreign buyers.  Regardless of the option, significant costs are 
associated with maintaining production capacity in reserve for the future.  
However, these costs can be reduced if the capacity is allocated for export 
production because the U.S. will incur neither production costs when there is no 
actual demand nor the holding costs associated with keeping non-operational 
systems in the inventory. 
Agmon et al. (1996) identified export production as a cost-saving solution 
to preserving production lines during gaps in U.S. production.  They noted that in 
the M1 main battle tank and AH-64 attack helicopter programs, a period of about 
two to three years elapsed between the end and resumption of U.S. production. 
During these periods, only export units remained in production.  In the case of 
the M1 production ending in 1993, maintaining the production base and 
employment levels through export enabled a one-third cost reduction for the U.S. 
M1 tank conversion program that commenced in 1995 (OUSD A&T, 1994).  
Similarly, export production of the AH-64 kept the production line “warm” after 
U.S. production ended in 1993 and recommenced in 1996 with production of the 
upgraded AH-64D (OUSD A&T, 1994).  In sum, export production provides a 
convenient lever for maintaining production line, and more broadly, industrial 
base, “warmth.” 
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IV. COST ANALYSIS: F-16 CASE STUDY 
A. PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
It is difficult to accurately isolate the financial benefits enjoyed by the U.S. 
from foreign arms production.  Theoretically, per unit cost reductions occur 
through increases in production volume due to economies of scale and gains in 
efficiency through learning.  Foreign arms sales present an opportunity to 
increase production volume and allocate nonrecurring and fixed costs to non-
U.S. customers.  The Lockheed Martin (formerly General Dynamics) F-16 fighter 
aircraft is one of the most prolific arms exports to date, flying under twenty-one 
separate flagged air forces.  It is also the most produced fourth-generation 
western fighter, with 4,519 copies to date (Janes, 2010).  Although this program 
began during the Cold War-era, the merits of using the F-16 as a case study for 
analysis lie in the fact that the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program involved the 
European Participating Governments (EPG) of Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Norway in the early development and later in the co-production 
of the aircraft.  This multinational effort resembles the F-35 joint strike fighter 
program in that several allied nations entered into an agreement to purchase a 
common aircraft that could be purchased affordably due to the large numbers of 
orders.  The program began in 1975, with the U.S. receiving its first five aircraft in 
1978.  Within a decade, close to 2,200 aircraft had been delivered, with foreign 
customers accounting for 35 percent of the total deliveries. 
Beginning 1981, a host of other nations entered into agreements with the 
U.S. to purchase the F-16 aircraft for their own air forces.  As of 2010, 50.1 
percent of all F-16 deliveries were to foreign customers.  Of those foreign 
deliveries, 22.8 percent were to the EPG (Janes, 2010).  The F-16 production for 
this analysis can be partitioned into two model generations, the A/B and the C/D.  
The A and the C models are single-seat aircraft, while the B and D are double-
seat variants primarily used for training.  This case study will focus on cost 
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reductions that result through larger production quantities as a result of 
increasing the market of the weapon system through foreign sales. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Although the F-16 is one of the most prevalent fighter aircraft programs in 
modern history, there is a profound dearth of detailed foreign sales and unit 
production cost data.  The DoD’s Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) provide 
annual data on U.S. procurement cost, U.S. procurement quantity, foreign 
procurement quantity and U.S. aircraft delivery.  The SARs do not contain data 
regarding foreign deliveries.  Foreign delivery data were obtained through F-16 
archivist Björn Claes (2010), who compiled a database of F-16 delivery 
schedules and quantities from Foreign Military Sales documents, official 
Lockheed Martin datasets and contacts from within foreign air forces. 
The SARs provide production and delivery data, covering the years 1975 
through 1994.  By the end of 1994, the F-16 program reached 90 percent of its 
expected production delivery and the SARs reporting concluded.  In fact, after 
1991 the U.S. deliveries significantly tapered off thereby making that year a 
reasonable upper bound for the analysis.  To identify cost reductions with cost 
improvement analysis, production for the U.S. and foreign customer-nations must 
be concurrent.  The cost and quantity data from 1984 coincides with deliveries of 
C/D models and the preponderance of foreign sales (excluding EPG).  For these 
reasons and others discussed in the following section, the scope of this case 
study focuses on F-16 deliveries between 1984 and 1991. 
Using cost improvement analysis, this case study takes a counterfactual 
approach to estimate per-unit cost if export production did not occur.  Two main 
types of cost improvement analysis exist: traditional cost improvement curves 
(CIC) and a rate adjustment CIC model that includes a rate term.  Traditional 
CICs are synonymous with learning curves and postulate that in production 
involving repetitive tasks, the per-unit variable costs will decrease by a certain 
factor with each doubling of cumulative production.  Moses (1990) notes that 
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production rates can lead to greater specialization of labor, quantity discounts in 
raw material purchases, and greater utilization of facilities thereby increasing the 
production quantity against which fixed overhead costs are allocated.  Bemis 
(1981), Boger and Liao (1990), Large et al. (1974), and Linder and Wilbourn 
(1973) suggest that together these effects can increase efficiency and reduce 
production cost (as cited in Moses, 1990).  However, Moses (1990) argues that 
increasing the production rate does not always reduce costs.  In fact, increased 
production rates can actually increase per unit costs due to factors such as over-
time pay, lack of skilled labor or additional fixed chunk investments to increase 
capacity, such as constructing more production facilities.  Moses (1990) notes 
that production rates can therefore lead to both economies and diseconomies of 
scale. 
Moses (1991) found traditional CICs engendered bias due to the existence 
of fixed costs in total cost and tended to understate the actual costs.  The rate 
adjustment CIC (RA CIC) eliminated this bias; however, Moses (1991) noted a 
tradeoff between bias and accuracy (Moses, 1991).  While in some cases Moses 
(1991) noted that traditional CICs can be more accurate, the existence of high 
fixed costs in F-16 production warrants the use of the rate adjustment model. The 
equation for the RA CIC is expressed by 
CR = aQbRc 
where 
CR = Unit cost of a F-16 at quantity Q and production per period R 
Q = Cumulative quantity of F-16 production 
R = F-16 production rate during given period 
a = Theoretical first unit cost 
b = Cost improvement curve exponent 
c = Production rate exponent 
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Given that the unit cost (UC) is a function of cumulative production volume 
and rate, theoretically a large production volume will decrease the UC.  For this 
case study, cumulative production is conceptualized as the sum of production for 
U.S. and foreign customer-nations.  Therefore, calculating the equation that 
represents the UC as a function of total cumulative production permits the 
estimation of the UC had the U.S. decided not to produce F-16 fighters for 
export. 
Given the lack of detailed data, assumptions were made regarding the 
nature of production and delivery.  A fundamental tenet of cost improvement 
analysis is that the units produced are homogeneous.  By the end of 1984, 99.2 
percent of the F-16 A/B models were delivered into the U.S. Air Force inventory.  
Save the remaining six undelivered A/B models, the follow-on F-16 deliveries to 
the U.S. were all C/D models.  Main differences between the A/B and C/D 
include improved cockpit avionics and radar.  These distinguishing qualities imply 
heterogeneity and the existence of different cost curves.  Within each model 
generation, additional variation exists between block numbers that denote 
upgrades.  However, the data do not permit disaggregation, so block variation is 
held constant in the model. As illustrated in Figure 5, a delivery usually occurred 
two years after procurement.  This two-year lag is also assumed to remain 























Figure 5.   F-16 Procurement vs. Delivery Quantity 
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Further, deliveries were assumed to follow the same pattern as production 
—that is, a delivery lot of size 150 succeeds a production lot of size 150.  Figure 
6 shows actual cost overlaid on U.S. delivery quantity.  The figure shows that 
peaks and troughs in average unit cost occur about two years before increases 
and decreases in delivery, respectively.  Therefore, the analysis will attach cost 
reductions to the year of delivery.  A second tenet of cost improvement analysis 
is the reduction in UC.  The SARs publish procurement annual cost and quantity 
that permits a unit cost for the U.S. to be calculated for each production year, 
which in effect becomes an annual average unit cost (AUC).  The cost data 
associated with the foreign sales can be misleading because additional 
premiums and discounts may be embedded in the foreign sales prices.  
Therefore, the model will use the annual U.S. AUC as the UC for all annual 
production.  After 1991, the U.S. tapered off its deliveries.  Consequently, the 
high fixed costs and reduced production base contributed to the uptick in AUC 








































Figure 6.   U.S. Average Unit Cost vs. U.S. Delivery Quantity 
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C. APPLICATION OF THE RATE ADJUSTMENT COST IMPROVEMENT 
CURVE  
The rate adjustment cost improvement curve model expresses the 
relationship between per-unit F-16 cost, cumulative production and production 
rate.  Using the stated assumptions, the relationship between F-16 cost, 
cumulative total F-16 production and total F-16 production rate between 1984 
and 1991 is expressed by the equation: 
CR = 721.3898Q-0.3618R-0.1009 
The rate adjustment cost improvement model enables the estimation of 
“what-if” costs to the U.S. if it decided not to produce F-16s for export from 1984-
91.  The annual delivery AUC is then calculated using the cumulative production 
in the quantity term and annual production in the rate term. Table 3 and Figure 7 
illustrate the annual per unit cost savings, which averages 24 percent during this 
eight-year period. 














1984 27.449 38.960 42%
1985 28.965 37.493 29%
1986 25.670 34.473 34%
1987 24.856 31.891 28%
1988 22.149 30.448 37%
1989 25.166 29.490 17%
1990 28.654 27.663 ‐3%
1991 25.419 27.498 8%





















































Figure 7.   Per Unit Cost Savings from Export Production 
As with any analysis, results are only as valid as the underlying 
assumptions.  The assumptions best reflect reality, but the results imply an 
inherent assumption about U.S. production decision-making and that is in the 
absence of export production, the U.S. would have followed the same production 
rate.  Data are not available to determine whether the U.S. would have changed 
its production rate policy.  Given the fixed costs and potential excess capacity, 
the U.S. may have decided to speed up the procurement schedule, and thus 
conclude production earlier.  Nevertheless, in light of the data and analysis 
presented here, the U.S. experiences an estimated average annual per-unit cost 
savings of 24 percent as a result of F-16 export production between 1984 and 
1991. 
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D. OTHER BENEFITS OF AN OPEN F-16 PRODUCTION LINE 
The U.S. F-16 program reached its 90 percent completion in 1994.  After 
1994, delivery quantity dropped to a squadron (24 aircraft) or less per year.  In 
fact, the F-16 delivery quantities to DoD dropped to single digits from 1997-2002.  
The last originally programmed U.S. F-16 delivery was for 1999, yet production 
continued at Lockheed’s Fort Worth plant.  Between 1995 and 2007, U.S. F-16 
deliveries constituted roughly ten percent of U.S. production and seven percent 
of all F-16s produced worldwide (Claes, 2010; Aerospace Industries Association, 
n.d.).  Further, the U.S. produced an average of 55 aircraft annually between 
1995 and 2007 (Claes, 2010), with F-16 production occurring in overseas plants 
averaging 21 aircraft per year during this same period.  From an operations and 
maintenance standpoint, DoD stands to benefit from a “warm” F-16 production 
line with the availability and reduced cost of spare parts.  Clearly, by continuing 
lower rate production beyond the U.S. planned requirement, this “warm” 
production line retained valuable skill sets. Whether those skill sets can be 
applied to the production of future, fifth-generation fighter aircraft, such as the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter, is a topic that warrants future research. 
Even after the U.S. ceased procurement of the F-16, Lockheed Martin 
continued to develop the F-16 for its foreign customers.  The F-16 E/Fs delivered 
to the United Arab Emirates in mid-2005 are considered “half of a generation” 
ahead of the U.S. F-16 inventory (Defense Industry Daily, 2010).  These F-16s 
are equipped with the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-80 AESA radar, making the 
UAE the first foreign military (other than the U.S. Air Force) to posses this 
revolutionary technology.  Indeed, the avionics and electronics of the F-16 have 
dramatically progressed.  In fact, the current F-16s produced for export have a 
core computer suite that has 2,000 times as much memory and over 260 times 
as much throughput as the original F-16s (Defense Industry Daily, 2010).  
Undoubtedly, the F-16’s currently rolling off the Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth 
plant are much more capable aircraft than the USAF’s own F-16 inventory.  
Should future fifth-generation combat aircraft, such as the F-35, become too 
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costly, the new production F-16s may be a cost-effective solution to supplement 
U.S. air forces.  This solution would be financially beneficial to DoD since export 
production kept the F-16 line and DoD would not incur the substantial costs of 
restarting a production line.  Further, the evolution of the F-16 was supported 
through export production.  If DoD did decide to procure new late-model F-16s, 
the costs associated with technology upgrades would have been subsidized 
through foreign sales, reducing DoD’s aircraft upgrade cost burden.  In sum, the 
F-16 production line kept “warm” and evolving through foreign demand provides 
a potentially cost-effective solution for supplementing U.S. combat aircraft 
inventory.  
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Brzoska (2004) points out that despite numerous analyses, books, and 
research articles on the global arms trade, very little is known about the financial 
aspects of arms exports.  Further, the acknowledgement of cost savings through 
arms exports is commonplace, though the magnitude of savings is rarely, if ever, 
quantified.  This research suggests that such conjectured savings do exist and 
they are potentially substantial.  However, as indicated in the CAT policy, 
financial factors are one aspect that must be considered in any proposed arms 
transfer.  Therefore, the quantification of financial benefits realized through 
export must be weighed against any potentially negative security externalities.  
While this research does not attempt to explicate the tradeoff between financial 
benefits and negative security implications arising from the transfer of arms, this 
research does provide an understanding of the financial gains through export 
production and insight into comprehending the holistic financial gains associated 
such proposed arms transfers. 
A. AFFORDING FUTURE DEFENSE THROUGH EXPORTS? 
Undoubtedly, constrained budgets, coupled with rising weapon system 
technology costs, compel reduced procurement quantities unless cost savings 
can be achieved.  As illustrated through the F-16 case study, export production 
can potentially provide generous per unit cost savings and therefore export 
production looks attractive as resources tighten.  Further, export production can 
provide positive quantifiable externalities by keeping aging production lines open 
and the industrial base “warm.”  However, if arms sales continue after the U.S. 
has taken ownership of its last buy of a particular weapon system and those 
sales are priced using only the variable costs of production and research and 
development, then the U.S. public may actually end up subsidizing arms sales 
over the long run. 
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Increased pressure for fiscal prudence can lead to arms export decisions 
that more heavily weigh the financial factors established in the CAT policy.  
Unless defense budgets increase or the services are increasingly willing to make 
do with less, arms export production may likely become a requisite feature of 
new weapon system programs. 
B. CONSIDERATIONS IN ARMS EXPORT PRODUCTION 
The F-16 case study suggests that indeed F-16 production for foreign 
customers was a cost saving venture for DoD, with an average annual unit cost 
savings of 24 percent during the production years analyzed.  However, these 
savings may not be representative of the “average” weapon system program that 
incorporates export production.  As mentioned, the F-16 is one of the most 
prolific combat aircraft produced and exported.  Therefore, given the extremely 
high export quantities, this analysis is more the exception than the rule.  
Consequently, this research serves more as an upper bound to potential savings, 
than the status quo. 
From a financial standpoint, decision-makers must be wary in assuming 
that export production is universally beneficial to DoD.  As discussed, if additive 
export production enables total production to achieve economies of scale, 
certainly export production is easier to justify in financial terms.  Conversely, if 
the additive export production necessitates substantial over-time labor charges or 
significant investments for chunk capacity, the export production may actually 
create diseconomies of scale.  
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